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The most important case to arise in the field of administrative
law in South Carolina during the period under consideration
was Atlantic Coast Line R.B. v. South Carolina Pub. Sern.
Comm'n.1 The facts of the case were as follows. The public
service commission had granted to the Dangerous Materials
Disposal Co. a "class E" certificate of public convenience and
necessity to transport radioactive materials in intrastate com-
merce. The appellant, the Atlantic Coast Line Rtailroad, and
several other motor lines objected to the granting of the certifi-
cate on the grounds that the motor certificate law contained in
the South Carolina Code (sections 58-1401 to -1661) is an uncon-
stitutional delegation of legislative power since there are no spe-
cific elements of proof or standards set forth for the commission
to follow. The commission was empowered to issue certificates
"when the public convenience and necessity .. . are not already
being reasonably served .... "1
The appellant argued that this provision violated the holding
in South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Harbin where legis-
lation authorizing the highway department to suspend or revoke
a driver's license "for cause satisfactory" was held to be an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The court in
Harbin observed that the legislature may not delegate its author-
ity to make laws when it establishes standards for the adminis-
trative agency to follow in carrying out the legislative intent.
On the basis of this reasoning the court found that the power to
suspend or revoke licenses for a "cause satisfactory" did not
establish sufficient legislative control over the decisions of the
board. However, the court also recognized that while the legis-
lative function may not be delegated, administrative boards may
be granted a certain amount of discretion, particularly in the
administration of police regulations, although just how much
discretion is allowed would be difficult to determine. The court
apparently felt that this would have to be decided on a case by
case basis. The more recent case of Cole v. Manning4 reaffirmed
the view that the amount of discretion delegated to an adminis-
1. 245 S.C. 229, 139 S.E2d 911 (1965).
2. Id. at 235, 139 S.E.2d at 914.
3. 226 S.C. 585, 86 S.E.2d 466 (1955).
4. 240 S.C. 260, 125 S.E.2d 621 (1962).
1
Ehrhorn: Administrative Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SouTH CAio~aiNA LAW REw
trative agency must depend in part on the circumstances of the
particular case. Therefore, administrative agencies are recog-
nized as having a certain amount of discretion either expressly
conferred, as in the case of police regulations, or implied, as
necessary to carry out the legislative intent, but such discretion
must be controlled by fixed legislative standards in order to
preclude any agency from wielding arbitrary power.
In applying the foregoing principles to the present case, the
South Carolina Supreme Court held that allowing a determina-
tion of public convenience and necessity by the commission is
not a delegation of unregulated discretion. In support of this
position the court cited the ruling of the United States Supreme
Court in Federal Radio Corm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mort-
gage Co.5 The Supreme Court there held that "in granting
licenses the commission is required to act as 'public convenience,
interest or necessity requires.' This criterion is not to be inter-
preted as setting up a standard so indefinite as to confer an
unlimited power.' 6
A secondary issue in Atlantic Coast Line R.R. was the claim
that since no specific findings of fact were made by the commis-
sion prior to issuing the certificate the decision to do so should
be set aside as unsupported by evidence. The basis for this con-
tention was derived from the decision in Drake v. Raybestos-
Manhattan, Inc.7  This case, however, dealt with workmen's
compensation and a different statute was involved. South Caro-
lina Code section 72-354 which governs the industrial commission
requires such findings of fact but there is no such requirement
for the public service commission although such findings might
be desirable (as noted in the case of E.L. Long Motor Lines,
Inc. v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Comm'n.)8 Also, there is no
constitutional requirement for such findings. The court disposed
of the second question by holding that orders of the commission
are presumed to be valid unless shown to be "arbitrary in the
sense that no two reasonable men could differ thereabout."9
Furthermore, an order made pursuant to legislative authority
will not be disturbed unless it is shown to be arbitrary or capri-
5. 289 U.S. 266 (1933).
6. Id. at 285.
7. 241 S.C. 116, 127 S.E.2d 288 (1962).
8. 233 S.C. 67, 103 S.E.2d 762 (1958).
9. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 245 S.C
229, 237, 139 S.E.2d 911, 914 (1965).
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cious as a matter of law. A court may not substitute its own
opinion for that of the commission simply because there may be
a difference of opinion as to the advisability of the commission's
decision. In the instant case the commission could not have made
the usual findings of fact because the certificate was to establish
a unique new service to fill a prospective or future need which
was based on the construction of nuclear installations in various
parts of the state and the prospect of nuclear vessels visiting
Charleston. No other motor carrier was certified to transport
radioactive materials so no finding could be made, however
advisable, to determine whether "the public convenience and
necessity in such territory are not already being reasonably
served by some other certificate holder."'1 For these reasons the
court could not find as a matter of law that the commission's
ruling was arbitrary or capricious.
The only other case worthy of mention in the area of adminis-
trative law was that of Em parte Wilson."' This case involved
the determination of the reasonableness of a South Carolina
prison regulation requiring that all legal documents prepared
by the prisoners be prepared in the prison "writ room" and pro-
viding for the confiscation of those legal documents prepared
elsewhere. The reasonableness of the requirement that prisoners
use the "writ room" was upheld in an earlier case of Ew parte
Wilson' 2 so that the unlawful collection of fees by "jailhouse
lawyers" for the preparation of such documents might be pre-
vented. In the present case the petitioner was protesting the
confiscation of certain papers which he prepared in his cell con-
trary to the regulations. The issue, therefore, was whether con-
fiscation of the papers was reasonably necessary for the enforce-
ment of the writ room regulation. In holding that it was the
only practical way to enforce the rule, the court observed that
there was a similar regulation providing for the confiscation of
legal materials prepared by the prisoners and found in their
housing units at the medical center for federal prisoners at
Springfield, Missouri. The court concluded that the rules in
force at the South Carolina prison are reasonably incident to the
proper operation of the facility and as implemented do not
deprive the inmates of their rights.
10. Id. at 238, 139 S.E.2d at 915.
11. 242 F. Supp. 537 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
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B. Legislation
No particularly significant changes were made in the area of
administrative law during the 1964-65 session of the general
assembly. However, there were some modifications of existing
agencies and the creation of one new agency that are noteworthy.
The new agency is the Western Carolina Higher Education
Commission."3 The commission will be composed of eight mem-
bers, two each from Allendale, Bamberg, Barnwell and Hamp-
ton counties, serving four year terms. Its duties are to encourage
the development of higher education including the establish-
ment of facilities to offer freshman and sophomore college
courses in the above mentioned counties. In the performance
of its duties the commission is given the power to make contracts,
make binding agreements, negotiate with educators and educa-
tional institutions and "generally, take such actions in its name
as are necessary to secure for the respective counties and adjacent
areas the educational facilities described in . . . this act."14
However, these activities of the commission will not bind the
counties in any way unless there is written approval from a
majority of the counties' legislative delegation. In addition,
the commission may borrow funds with the approval of the
legislative delegation from each county, and accept gifts, grants,
or donations and hold title to real and personal property. On
June 30 of each year the commission will be required to submit
a report to the legislative delegation from each county account-
ing for all funds spent during the preceding year.
Because of the recognized need for improved traffic safety,
sweeping amendments were undertaken affecting both the state
highway department and the state educational finance commis-
sion.15 The state highway department is now authorized to in-
spect motor vehicles when there is reasonable cause to believe
that the vehicle or its equipment is not in proper repair. This
authority to inspect is limited to the brakes, lights, horn, tires,
and windshield wipers. When any vehicle is found to be in an
unsafe condition, written notice will be given to the driver and
to the highway department specifying the particular repairs to
be made. The repairs must be completed within ten days, after
which completion a certificate of inspection and approval must
13. S.C. Acrs & J. REs. 1965, p. 269.
14. S.C. AcTs & J. REs. 1965, p. 269.
15. S.C. AcTs & J. REs. 1965, p. 649.
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be obtained from an officer of the highway department. Viola-
tions of this act will constitute a misdemeanor which may be
punished by a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars or more
than one-hundred dollars.
Section two of the act specifies that eye examinations will be
required by the highway department of all persons seeking to
have their driver's licenses renewed. The examinations may be
performed by any person authorized by law to perform such
examinations, and he must certify that the minimum standards
of vision required by the highway department are met. How-
ever, the highway department is not authorized to require a
greater degree of vision than 20/40 corrected in one eye. Where
correction is necessary it will be noted on the driver's license
and it will be unlawful for such person to operate a motor
vehicle without the aid of such correction. A violation of this
section will constitute a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of
not more than one-hundred dollars or not more than thirty days
in jail.
Section six of the act amends South Carolina Code section
21-839 regulating the certification of school bus drivers. The
importance of this amendment' 5 is that examination and certifi-
cation of school bus drivers will be conducted by the state edu-
cational finance commission instead of the state highway depart-
ment.
Sections seven through fourteen provide for the establishment
of driver education programs under the auspices of the state
board of education. The board of education is authorized to
promulgate rules and regulations for the establishment of driver
education programs by the local school districts. Section eight
defines which schools are qualified to conduct such programs,
and section nine specifies the standards necessary in order for
credit to be given for the course. Provision is also made for
state aid in support of the program and for a method of
determining its cost.
Of somewhat less significance is an act to amend South Caro-
lina Code section 1-367 regulating the granting of phosphate
mining licenses by the state budget and control board. 16 The
board may grant leases or licenses for such terms as are neces-
sary, and fix the amount of royalty to be paid to the state.
However, prior to the granting of a lease or license the board
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must publish notice of such application in a newspaper of gen-
eral circulation within the county where the mining is to take
place.
Also of comparatively minor significance is an act to amend
South Carolina Code sections 56-1560 and 56-1565 relating to the
license fees for the practice of veterinary medicine.17 Section
one of the act gives the state board of veterinary examiners
authority to set a fee not to exceed fifty dollars to accompany
an application for a license to practice veterinary medicine in
this state. Section two of the act provides for the collection by
the board of examiners of an annual fee not to exceed ten dollars.
Of greater importance is an act to amend chapter one of title
561s regulating the licensing of accountants. 19 The basic statute
remains unchanged, with the amendments serving primarily to
supplement the original act by specifying in greater detail the
duties and powers of the board of certified public account ex-
aminers and the standards to be applied for the certification or
revocation of certification of accountants.
ROBERT M. Eng oiN, JR.
17. S.C. Acrs & J. l~s. 1965, p. 316.
18. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-1 to -26 (1962).
19. S.C. AcTs & J. REs. 1965, p. 478.
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